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Unequal Longevities and Lifestyles Transmission
Gregory Ponthierey
December 18, 2008
Abstract
Whereas studies on the optimal taxation under endogenous longevity
assume a xed heterogeneity of lifestyles, this paper considers the optimal
tax policy in an economy where unequal longevities are the unintended
outcome of di¤erences in lifestyles, and where lifestyles are transmitted
across generations. For that purpose, we develop a three-period OLG
model where the population, who ignores the negative impact of excessive
work on longevity, is partitioned in two groups with di¤erent tastes for
leisure, and follows an adaptation/imitation process à la Bisin and Verdier
(2001). The optimal short-run and long-run Pigouvian taxes on wages
are shown to di¤er, because the latter correct agentsmyopia, but also
internalize intergenerational externalities due to the socialization process.
Keywords: longevity, OLG model, lifestyle, socialization, intergenera-
tional externalities, Pigouvian taxes.
JEL codes: I12, I18, Z13.
1 Introduction
Although longevity di¤erentials can be partly explained by genetic and envi-
ronmental factors, how long one lives depends also on how one lives. Actually,
various dimensions of lifestyles are shown to a¤ect longevity, so that unequal
longevities reect - among other things - the diversity of lifestyles.1
The existence of longevity inequalities due to heterogeneous lifestyles raises
the question of the necessity, for a government, to intervene in that context. In
particular, should a utilitarian government do anything in front of such inequal-
ities in longevity due to lifestyle di¤erentials?
That question has been recently explored by Leroux et al (2008), who stud-
ied the optimal tax policy in an economy where agents, because of di¤erences in
The author would like to thank Alberto Bisin, Giacomo Corneo, Philippe De Donder,
Chaim Fershtman, Emmanuel Frot, Firouz Ghavari, Pierre Pestieau, Thierry Verdier, Jie
Zhang and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments.
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1Longevity was shown to be a¤ected, ceteris paribus, by smoking (Doll and Hill, 1950),
by alcoholism (Poikolainen, 1982), by the quantity and quality of food (Bender et al, 1998;
Stamler, 1973), and by physical activity (Pa¤enbarger et al, 1978).
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productivity, in genetic backgrounds, and in their degree of myopia, choose dif-
ferent levels of longevity-enhancing (monetary) e¤orts. In that paper, whether
health spending should be taxed or subsidized depends on two major determi-
nants. On the one hand, the myopia of agents, which prevents them from seeing
the positive impact of health spending on longevity, invites a corrective subsidy
on health spending. On the other hand, given that investing in health can in-
volve an externality, in the sense that agents do not necessarily internalize the
impact of health spending on the resources available per person at the old age,
a tax on health expenditures may be required to internalize that externality.2
Whereas that study highlights some determinants of the optimal subsidy on
health spending, one of its limitations is to take the partition of the population
into di¤erent groups as xed. The postulate of a xed heterogeneity of the pop-
ulation is strong, as one may expect that the composition of a population into
di¤erent groups having distinct lifestyles is likely to vary over time. Moreover,
the heterogeneity of the population may also be inuenced by the government
itself, so that the question of the optimal structure of heterogeneity can hardly
be escaped. Hence, the endogeneity of the composition of the population raises
additional questions regarding the optimal public intervention.
The goal of this paper is to study the optimal taxation policy in an econ-
omy where unequal longevities result from di¤erences in lifestyles, and where
the composition of the population into di¤erent lifestyles is endogenously de-
termined in the economy. As in Leroux et al (2008), the optimal policy will
still depend here not only on how rationalagents are in their decisions (i.e.
on the extent to which ones lifestyle maximizes ones lifetime welfare), but,
also, on how individual behaviours a¤ect social welfare (i.e. on the extent to
which ones lifestyle a¤ects otherswelfares). In order to do justice to those two
determinants of the optimal policy, the specicity of this paper shall be twofold.
First, this paper focuses on an economy where di¤erentials in longevity are
the unintended outcome of di¤erences in lifestyles, in the sense that agents
su¤er from a myopia preventing them from seeing the impact of their lifestyle
on longevity. Hence, under such a myopia, the chosen lifestyle is non-optimal
from the point of view of lifetime welfare maximization, and, thus, invites a
correction by the State. Second, this paper considers another unintended e¤ect
of lifestyles: their impact on the taste composition of future cohorts. Actually,
the partition of a population into groups with di¤erent lifestyles is not assumed
to be exogenous here, but is a¤ected by agents choices. Hence, given that
agents lifestyles shape the tastes composition of next cohorts, the resulting
unintended welfare e¤ects invite also a correction.
At this stage, it should be stressed that the corrections required for the in-
ternalization, at the individual level, of the impact of ones lifestyle decision on
ones lifetime welfare may di¤er from the corrections required for the internaliza-
tion of intergenerational composition e¤ects. Hence, it is not straightforward
to see what a utilitarian government should do in this context.
This paper aims at casting a new light on that issue, by studying the opti-
2That externality was rstly emphasized by Becker and Philipson (1998).
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mal tax policy in an economy where the partition of the population in distinct
(longevity-a¤ecting) lifestyles is endogenous. That issue has not been studied
so far, as dynamic studies on the optimal policy under endogenous longevity
focussed on homogeneous populations (see Zhang et al, 2006), or involved an
unexplained heterogeneity (see Pestieau et al, 2008).3 On the contrary, this
paper studies optimal policy under unequal longevities due to an explicit cause,
the adopted lifestyle, whose transmission across generations is modelled.
For that purpose, we set up a three-period OLG model, where the length of
the retirement period (i.e. the third period) depends on the lifestyle adopted
during the active life (i.e. the second period). For simplicity, agents di¤er
on a single dimension of lifestyle: the length of working time, following Nylen
et als (2001) study showing that overwork leads, ceteris paribus, to a shorter
life.4 Thus, each cohort, who ignores the impact of work on longevity, is, at
adulthood, divided into two types of agents, having a more or less strong taste
for leisure, and choosing their working time accordingly.
To study the optimal policy under an endogenous composition of the popula-
tion, it is assumed that the adherence to a lifestyle is acquired, during childhood,
through an adaptation and imitation process à la Bisin and Verdier (2001),
where parentssocialization e¤orts and the social environment interact. Note
that the socialization process and the demography inuence each others strongly
in our economy: while the (aggregated) life expectancy depends on the compo-
sition of the population into di¤erent types, the socialization e¤orts chosen by
parents are increasing in their (type-specic) time horizons, so that the long-run
composition of the population is determined by the demography.
The major result of this paper is to highlight that the policies required for the
decentralizations of the short-run social optimum - i.e. under a xed partition of
the population - and of the long-run social optimum - i.e. under an endogenous
partition - di¤er, as the latter involves not only a correction for agentsmyopia,
but, also, a correction for unintended composition e¤ectsof individual labour
choices on future cohortstastes under the prevailing socialization mechanism.
Hence, this paper emphasizes a dilemma between, on the one hand, correcting
the myopia of existing people and, on the other hand, the internalization of the
intergenerational externalities due to the socialization process.
This rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model,
describes the temporary equilibrium under laissez-faire, and examines the ex-
istence, uniqueness and stability of steady-state equilibria. Section 3 describes
the short-run and long-run social optima, and studies their decentralization.
Section 4 concludes.
3By unexplained heterogeneity, I mean that nothing explains, in the model, why some
members of a cohort live longer than others.
4See also Van Echtelt (2005) on the negative impact of overwork on longevity. Given the
tendency of extra work to favor hart-diseases (see Hayashi et al, 1996), diabetes (see Kawakami
et al, 1999) and obesity (see Nakamura et al, 1998), that relation is quite robust.
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2 The model
2.1 Environment
Let us consider a three-period OLG model. Each cohort is a continuum of
agents, with a measure normalized to 1.
Period 1, which is of unitary length, is a period of childhood, during which
one has no consumption, does not work, and is only subject to socialization.5
During period 2, which is also of unitary length, individuals work, enjoy some
leisure and consume. Period 3 is a period of retirement, whose length depends
on the lifestyle adopted during the active life (i.e. period 2).
During their childhood (period 1), all members of a cohort are the same,
and have no cultural type. However, once adult (in periods 2 and 3), a cohort
becomes divided in two kinds of agents, depending on their preferences. We
shall, in this paper, assume that the two kinds of agents di¤er only regarding
the intensity of their taste for leisure with respect to consumption. Thus, each
adult agent within a cohort is either of type C, i.e. consumption-lover, or of
type L, i.e. leisure-lover. Agents of type i 2 fC;Lg work during their second
period of life, have one child, and are retired in period 3.
Throughout the paper, the mass of agents born at time t who are of type C
when being young adults (at time t+1) shall be denoted by qt+1 (0  qt+1  1),
while the mass of young adults of type L is equal to 1  qt+1.
Longevity Agents of type i 2 fC;Lg born at t live periods 1 and 2, of
length one. The period of retirement (period 3) has a length hit+2 (0  hit+2  1)
determined by the lifestyle adopted during the active life (period 2). While the
length of the retirement period is a function of various factors (including, for
instance, sin goods consumption), we shall, for simplicity, assume that hit+2
depends on a single aspect of lifestyle. Following studies by Nylen et al (2001)
and Van Echtelt (2005) on the impact of work on longevity, it will be assumed
that working time during active life has a negative and increasing impact on
longevity.6 This amounts to assume that the length of the retirement period
depends only on the leisure time enjoyed during active life, lit+1 (0  lit+1  1):
hit+2 = h(l
i
t+1) (1)
where h0(lit+1) > 0, h
00(lit+1) < 0.
For analytical convenience, we shall, in this paper, assume that:
h(lit+1) =
lit+1
1 + lit+1
(2)
That functional form, based on Chakraborty (2004), satises the above condi-
tions, and allows the analytical solvability of the model.
5Hence, the model behaves like a two-period OLG model.
6On the impact of work on longevity, see also Hayashi et al (1996), Kawakami et al (1999)
and Nakamura et al (1998).
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Production For simplicity, production is assumed to be linear in labour:
yt = wLt (3)
where yt is the output, w is a productivity parameter, and Lt is the total labour
force, dened as Lt = qt(1   lCt ) + (1   qt)(1   lLt ), where 1   lit is the labour
supplied by agents of type i 2 fC;Lg.7 Factors are paid at their marginal
productivity: each unit of labour supplied is paid by a wage w.
Socialization The population follows an adaptation and imitation process
à la Bisin and Verdier (2001). The transmission of the cultural trait i 2 fC;Lg
is modelled as a mechanism where socialization inside the family (direct ver-
ticalsocialization) and socialization outside the family (obliquesocialization)
interact.
Families are composed of a single parent and a single child. Children are
born at time t without any dened cultural trait, and are rst exposed to their
parents lifestyle. Direct vertical socialization to the parents trait i 2 fC;Lg
occurs with a probability it+1: If the direct vertical socialization to the parents
trait does not take place, which happens with a probability 1  it+1, the child
will then pick up the trait of a person - i.e. a role model- chosen randomly in
the population of young adults, and, thus, will pick the trait C with a probability
qt, and the trait L with a probability 1  qt.
Hence, if pCCt+1 and p
CL
t+1 (resp. p
LL
t+1 and p
LC
t+1) denote the probabilities that
a child born at t in a family with trait C (resp. L) is socialized to, respectively,
trait C and trait L (resp. L and C), the transition probabilities are:
pCCt+1 = 
C
t+1 +
 
1  Ct+1

qt p
CL
t+1 =
 
1  Ct+1

(1  qt)
pLLt+1 = 
L
t+1 +
 
1  Lt+1

(1  qt) pLCt+1 =
 
1  Lt+1

(qt)
(4)
By the Law of Large Numbers, pijt+1 is also equal to the proportion of children
whose parents are of type i who have the cultural trait j. Hence, the proportion
qt+1 of agents born at time t who become of type C follows the dynamic law:
qt+1 =

Ct+1 +
 
1  Ct+1

qt

qt +
 
1  Lt+1

qt

(1  qt) (5)
The rst term of (5) is the probability to be socialized to trait C when having
a family of type C, multiplied by the probability to belong to a family of type
C. The second term is the probability to acquire trait C when being born in a
family of type L, multiplied by the probability to belong to a family of type L.
Following Bisin and Verdier (2001), we assume that parents of type i 2
fC;Lg can socialize their children born at time t vertically, by educating them
through a (purely physical) socialization e¤ort eit (0  eit  1). The socialization
e¤ort eit constitutes an input in the cultural production of their children as
adults: it+1 = (e
i
t): A welfare loss C(e
i
t) is generated by a socialization e¤ort
eit.
8
7The labour from the two types of agents are equally productive.
8We assume C(0) = 0, C(eit) > 0 for e
i
t > 0, C
0(eit) > 0 and C00(eit) > 0.
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Parents have a welfare gain from coexisting with children with the same type
as themselves. The welfare derived by a parent of type i born at t  1 when he
coexists with a child of type i, denoted by 'iit+1, exceeds the welfare derived by
a parent of type i when he coexists with a child of type j 6= i, denoted 'ijt+1. In
this paper, welfare gains from having children of ones own type are independent
from ones type and from time ('CCt+1 = '
LL
t+1 = '^ and '
CL
t+1 = '
LC
t+1 = ~').
Hence, under additive lifetime welfare, the socialization e¤ort eit chosen by
a parent of type i maximizes:
uit 1 = u(c
i
t; l
i
t) C(eit)+E
 
hit+1
 h
u(E(dit+1); 1) + p
ii
t+1(e
i
t)'^+ p
ij
t+1(e
i
t)~'
i
(6)
where u(cit; l
i
t) is the utility of period 2, which involves a consumption c
i
t and a
leisure lit, and E
 
hit+1

u(E(dit+1); 1) is the expected utility of period 3, which
involves an (expected) annuitized consumption E(dit+1), and no work. E
 
hit+1

is the expected length of period 3.9
Parents, when choosing eit, weight the cost of socialization - C(e
i
t) - against
its expected gains - E
 
hit+1
 h
piit+1(e
i
t)'^+ p
ij
t+1(e
i
t)~'
i
-, which depend on the
inuence of their e¤ort eit on probabilities p
ii
t+1 and p
ij
t+1, determined by the
relation it+1 = (e
i
t), and on the expected length of their retirement period,
E
 
hit+1

.
While there exist various ways to model the relation it+1 = (e
i
t), we shall
assume that the probability of direct vertical socialization to trait i it+1 equals
parents socialization e¤ort eit, in conformity with what Bisin and Verdier (2001)
call the Its the family transmission technology:
it+1 = e
i
t (7)
That technology, which is most adequate for our purpose, exhibits what Bisin
and Verdier call cultural substitution: a higher proportion of agents of type i
in the population of reference makes parents of type i choose a lower e¤ort.10
Agentsdecisions In order to describe how agents of types C and L make
their decisions, we need to make three additional assumptions.
First, temporal welfare u(cit; l
i
t) is, for analytical convenience, assumed to
take a Cobb-Douglas form in consumption and leisure time:
u(ci; li) = (ci)
i
(li)1 
i
(8)
where 0 < i < 1. Given that i reects the importance of consumption with
respect to leisure, we have here C > L.
9For simplicity, there is no pure time preference here.
10As shown by Bisin and Verdier (2001), technologies with no cultural substitutability can
lead to stable equilibria without heterogeneity, which is inadequate for the purpose of this
study.
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Second, each agent - whatever his type - does not, when making his decisions,
internalize its impact on longevity, but, rather, forms myopic anticipations, in
the sense that he expects to have a life as long as the one of his modeladult:
E
 
hit+1

= hit (9)
This assumption consists of type-specic myopic anticipations.
Third, the welfare cost from socialization e¤orts, C(eit), takes the form:
C(eit) =
(eit)
2
2
(10)
where  accounts for the disutility of socialization e¤ort ( > 0).
Substituting u(ci; li), E
 
hit+1

and C(eit) in the function ui;t 1 allows us to
rewrite the expected lifetime welfare of an agent of type i born at t  1 as:11
uit 1 = (c
i)
i
(li)1 
i   (e
i
t)
2
2
+ hit
h
(dit+1)
i + piit+1'^+ p
ij
t+1~'
i
(11)
2.2 Temporary equilibrium
At the beginning of adulthood (i.e. of period 2), each agent of type i 2 fC;Lg
chooses second and third-period consumptions, as well as socialization e¤ort
and leisure time, in such a way as to maximize his welfare subject to his budget
constraint:
max
cit;d
i
t+1;e
i
t;l
i
t
(cit)
i(lit)
1 i   (e
i
t)
2
2
+ hit
h
(dit+1)
i + piit+1'^+ p
ij
t+1~'
i
s.t. : cit + h
i
td
i
t+1  w(1  lit)
Assuming an interior solution, the FOCs of that problem are:
C(cCt )
C 1(lCt )
1 C = C L(cLt )
L 1(lLt )
1 L = L
C(dCt+1)
C 1 = C L(dLt+1)
L 1 = L
eCt =
hCt (1 qt)('^ ~')
 e
L
t =
hLt (qt)('^ ~')

(1  C)(cCt )
C
(lCt )
 C = Cw (1  L)(cLt )
L
(lLt )
 L = Lw
where C and L denote the Lagrange multipliers associated with the budget
constraints of agents of types C and L.12
Grouping the rst two FOCs shows that, for all agents, second-period con-
sumption is lower than third-period consumption. That result comes from our
utility function, under which the welfare return of consumption is higher the
higher leisure time is, so that agents choose to consume more when retired.
11We abstract here from childhood.
12Given that eCt and e
L
t lie, for any value of qt, between 0 and 1, it must be assumed here
that 0  hCt ('^  ~') =  1 and 0  hLt ('^  ~') =  1.
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Regarding socialization, one can notice that cultural substitution holds here:
eCt is decreasing in qt, and e
L
t is increasing in qt. Note also that the expected
longevity has a positive impact on the chosen socialization e¤ort: the longer the
third period is expected to be, the longer the expected period of coexistence
with a child of ones type is. Hence, a larger expected longevity leads to a larger
welfare gain from socialization, and, thus, to a higher socialization e¤ort. If
hCt < h
L
t , one can expect that parents of type L choose, ceteris paribus, a larger
socialization e¤ort than agents of type C. As we shall see, this horizon e¤ect
has a crucial impact on the long-run dynamics of the population structure.
As far as the choice of leisure is concerned, combining the rst two FOCs
with the fourth one and substituting the budget constraint yields:13
lCt = 1  C(1 + hCt ) lLt = 1  L(1 + hLt )
In the light of those expressions, it is not obvious to see whether agents
with a lower taste for leisure will necessarily choose a lower leisure level, as
there are two e¤ects at work. If agents had the same expected longevities (i.e.
hCt = h
L
t ), it would follow, under 
C > L, that agents with a low taste for
leisure would choose a lower leisure (lCt < l
L
t ). However, the leisure decision
depends also on the expected lifetime. Thus, under hCt < h
L
t , it might be the
case that agents of type C choose, despite C > L, a higher leisure, because
they expect to live a shorter life, which makes labour less useful. Note that, if
C=L > 2, the rst e¤ect necessarily dominates the second, so that, whatever
the prevailing group-specic longevities are, agents of type L choose necessarily
a higher leisure, even though they expect to live longer than agents of type C.
Our results are summarized in Proposition 1.14
Proposition 1 Under the laissez-faire,
- cit  dit+1 8i 2 fC;Lg,
- if hCt = h
L
t =
ht, then lCt < l
L
t , d
C
t+1 > d
L
t+1 and
cCt
lCt
>
cLt
lLt
,
- if hCt 6= hLt , then lCt S lLt , dCt+1 T dLt+1 and c
C
t
lCt
T c
L
t
lLt
i¤ 
C
L
T 1+h
L
t
1+hCt
,
- under hCt < h
L
t and
C
L
> 2, we have lCt < l
L
t , d
C
t+1 > d
L
t+1 and
cCt
lCt
>
cLt
lLt
,
- eCt R eLt () 1 qtqt T
hLt
hCt
.
Regarding the last part of Proposition 1, note that whether agents of type C
make a larger socialization e¤ort than agents of type L depends not only on the
prevailing partition of the population, but, also, on group-specic longevities.
The longer the retirement period is expected to be, the more the adult will
socialize his child ceteris paribus.
13 In order to guarantee a non-negative leisure level [i.e. lit  0 8i 2 fC;Lg], we shall,
in the rest of this paper, assume that i(1 + hit)  1 8hit 2 [0; 1], which is equivalent to
i  1=2 8i 2 fC;Lg :
14See the Appendix for the proof.
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2.3 Steady-state equilibria
The existence of a steady-state depends on the existence, in the
 
qt; h
C
t ; h
L
t

space, of an intersection of the qq, hhC and hhL loci, along which respectively
qt, hCt and h
L
t are constant. Let us dene those loci formally.
Substituting for Ct+1 = e
C
t and 
L
t+1 = e
L
t in expression (5) yields:
qt+1 = qt +
'^  ~'

 
hCt (1  qt)2qt   hLt (qt)2(1  qt)

Fixing qt+1 = qt = q in that expression allows us to derive the qq locus,
along which q is constant. Actually, there exist three values of q allowing the
constancy of the composition of the population over time:
q = 0; q =
hC
hL + hC
; q = 1
Thus, the qq locus is made of those three components.
At the steady-state, it must also be the case that agent-specic longevities
are constant. hCt+1 can be written as:
hCt+1 =
1  C(1 + hCt )
2  C(1 + hCt )
Hence, hCt+1 = h
C
t denes the hh
C locus as follows:
hC =
1  2
q
1  C(1  C)
C
Note that the steady-state value of hC depends only on C , and is decreasing
in C .
Similarly, from
hLt+1 =
1  L(1 + hLt )
2  L(1 + hLt )
one can derive the hhL locus, along which hL is constant over time:
hL =
1  2
q
1  L(1  L)
L
That long-run value of hL depends only on L, and is decreasing in L.
Regarding the existence of an intersection of the three loci qq, hhC and hhL
in the
 
qt; h
C
t ; h
L
t

space, it is clear that, if q equals 1 (resp. 0), the variable
hL (resp. hC) is not dened, so that the system becomes 2-dimensional, and
the steady-state consists merely of the intersection of the hhC locus (resp. hhL
locus) with the qq locus corresponding to q = 1 (resp. q = 0). The qq and hhC
loci (resp. hhL locus) being non parallel lines, these must intersect only once.
9
Thus, the economy admits two steady-state equilibria with a homogeneous pop-
ulation, entirely made either of agents of type C (i.e. q = 1), or, alternatively,
of agents of type L (i.e. q = 0).
The issue of existence of a steady-state with a heterogeneous population can
be reformulated as the question of the intersection of the qq, hhC and hhL loci
strictly within the
 
qt; h
C
t ; h
L
t

space. Under the postulated functional forms, it
can be shown that the three loci intersect only once at a value of q 6= 0 6= 1,
so that there exists a unique steady-state with a heterogeneous population.
Moreover, it is shown in the Appendix that the intermediate steady-state is,
under mild conditions, (locally) stable, in the sense that any economy that does
not lie initially at another steady-state equilibrium will converge towards the
intermediate steady-state. Those results are summarized below.15
Proposition 2 There exist three steady-state equilibria:
- q = 0, hL = 1 
2
p
1 L(1 L)
L
.
- q = h
C
hL+hC
, hC = 1 
2
p
1 C(1 C)
C
, hL = 1 
2
p
1 L(1 L)
L
.
- q = 1, hC = 1 
2
p
1 C(1 C)
C
.
The intermediate steady-state is, under mild conditions, locally stable.
Given that the intermediate steady-state (i.e. involving heterogeneity in
tastes) is the equilibrium that is the most likely to emerge - except if the pop-
ulation is initially uniform - we shall, in the rest of this paper, pay a particular
attention to that steady-state equilibrium, which is described by Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 At the intermediate steady-state equilibrium, we have:
- hC < hL,
- q < 1=2,
- lC < lL,
- ci < di 8i 2 fC;Lg, dC > dL and cC
lC
> c
L
lL
,
- eC = eL:
The proof of those results goes as follows. Given that C > L, the steady-
state longevity of agents of type L is larger than the one of agents of type C, as
equilibrium longevity hi is decreasing in i for i 2 fC;Lg. Another prediction
of the model concerns the long-run composition of the population. Actually,
given that hL > hC , the steady-state population will be composed by a larger
proportion of leisure-loversthan consumption-lovers.16 Hence, if q0 > h
C
hC+hL
,
the model predicts the rise of a leisure society(a fall of qt over time), on the
grounds that parents of type L, by facing, on average, a longer expected lifetime
- and thus higher payo¤s from having children like them - tend, ceteris paribus,
to make a stronger e¤ort to transmit their trait, which will lead, in the long-run,
to the larger propagation of their own lifestyle. As agents of type L live longer
15See the Appendix for the proof.
16This is so because q = h
C
hC+hL
< 1=2 when hC < hL.
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at the steady-state, it must also be the case, under the postulated longevity
production, that these work less, so that lC < lL, dC > dL and cC=lC > cL=lL.
Finally, given that, at the steady-state, q = h
C
hC+hL
, it is straightforward to see
from the FOC for optimal socialization e¤ort that the two types of agents must
do the same levels of socialization e¤ort at the steady-state.
3 Social optimum and optimal policy
Let us now characterize the social optimum in the economy under study. For
that purpose, social welfare shall be dened in the standard utilitarian way, as
the sum of utilities of each group of agents, weighted by their size.17
Given that this paper aims at emphasizing the importance of composition
e¤ectsfor the denition of the optimal public intervention, we will proceed here
in two stages, and consider rst the short-run social optimum, i.e. the optimum
for a given partition qt, and, then, the long-run social optimum. That two-stage
procedure will also allow us, when studying the decentralization of the social
optimum, to compare the optimal policies under exogenous and endogenous
composition of the population in terms of tastes.
3.1 The short-run rst-best problem
The short-run rst-best solution The short-run social optimum is the
octuplet

cCt ; c
L
t ; d
C
t+1; d
L
t+1; e
C
t ; e
L
t ; l
C
t ; l
L
t
	
maximizing the following Lagrangian:
$ = (qt)

(cCt )
C (lCt )
1 C   (e
C
t )
2
2
+ hCt+1
h
(dCt+1)
C + pCCt+1'^+ p
CL
t+1~'
i
+(1  qt)

(cLt )
L(lLt )
1 L   (e
L
t )
2
2
+ hLt+1
h
(dLt+1)
L + pLLt+1'^+ p
LC
t+1~'
i
+

w
 
qt(1  lCt ) + (1  qt)(1  lLt )
  qtcCt   (1  qt)cLt   qthCt+1dCt+1   (1  qt)hLt+1dLt+1
where  is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the resource constraint. Note
that the partition of the population qt is here taken as given.
The FOCs for optimal consumptions and socialization e¤orts are:
C(cCt )
C 1(lCt )
1 C =  = L(cLt )
L 1(lLt )
1 L eCt =
hCt+1(1 qt)('^ ~')

C(dCt+1)
C 1 =  = L(dLt+1)
L 1 eLt =
hLt+1(qt)('^ ~')

The rst two FOCs involve the standard equalization of marginal utilities of
consumption for the di¤erent types of agents at the two periods. Those FOCs
17As it is well-known, the aggregation of utilities of agents having di¤erent preferences makes
sense only if individual utilities are interpersonally comparable. One way to achieve this is, as
proposed by Mirrlees (1982, p. 78-80), by means of discussions between agents about utilities.
Although agents of types C and L have di¤erent tastes, they may communicate about their
life experiences, and reach an agreement as to how their welfare should be included in a social
welfare function. We assume that such an agreement can be reached, so that the aggregation
of utilities of agents of di¤erent types in a social welfare function makes sense.
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imply that second-period consumption cannot exceed third-period consumption.
These imply also that dCt+1 exceeds d
L
t+1, and that c
C
t =l
C
t > c
L
t =l
L
t .
As indicated by the two FOCs concerning socialization e¤orts, the short-run
social optimum requires socialization e¤ort levels to be chosen on the basis of
optimal - rather than expected - future (group-specic) longevities. Hence, the
optimal socialization e¤ort is larger than the one under laissez-faire if and only
if the expected longevity is lower than the optimal longevity. Regarding how
optimal socialization e¤orts di¤er across agents of di¤erent types, the FOCs
suggest that this depends on whether (1  qt) =qt exceeds hLt+1=hCt+1 or not.
The FOCs for optimal leisure times are:
(cCt )
C (1  C)(lCt ) 
C
+ hC0t+1
h
(dCt+1)
C + pCCt+1'^+ p
CL
t+1~'
i
w + hC0t+1d
C
t+1
= 
(cLt )
L(1  L)(lLt ) 
L
+ hL0t+1
h
(dLt+1)
L + pLLt+1'^+ p
LC
t+1~'
i
w + hL0t+1d
L
t+1
= 
Note that those FOCs di¤er from the FOCs for optimal leisure under laissez-
faire. Clearly, both types of agents tend, under laissez-faire, to have a too low
level of leisure with respect to what is socially optimal. The reason for this lies
in agentstendency to take the length of the third period of life as xed, whereas
this depends on their working time during the second period.18 This myopia
implies that longevities under laissez-faire are lower than their rst-best levels.
It implies also that ciLFt =d
iLF
t+1 < c
iFB
t =d
iFB
t+1 for all agents of type i 2 fC;Lg,
meaning that all agents tend to oversave with respect to what is optimal. In
the light of this, we can describe the short-run social optimum as follows.19
Proposition 4 The short-run social optimum is such that:
- ciFBt  diFBt+1 8i 2 fC;Lg; dCFBt+1 > dLFBt+1 ; c
CFB
t
lCFBt
>
cLFBt
lLFBt
;
- eiLFt S eiFBt () hiLFt S hiFBt+1 8i 2 fC;Lg ;
- eCFBt S eLFBt () 1 qtqt S
hLFBt+1
hCFBt+1
;
- liLFt < l
iFB
t 8i 2 fC;Lg, so that c
iLF
t
diLFt+1
<
ciFBt
diFBt+1
8i 2 fC;Lg ;
- hiLFt+1 < h
iFB
t+1 8i 2 fC;Lg :
Decentralization of the short-run social optimum This subsection
studies the decentralization of the short-run social optimum by means of group-
specic tax/transfers instruments. Note that such instruments suppose that the
18Note that the fact that agents choose a too low leisure level - independently from the
expected welfare gains from coexistence with children - is here due to the postulated functional
form, which implies the fear of ruinproperty u0(d)d < u(d) [as id
i 1d < d
i
under i < 1]
(see Eeckhoudt and Pestieau, 2007).
19See the Appendix for a proof of those statements.
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government can observe the type of agents.20 Moreover, this analysis assumes
also that agents cannot change their type.21
Comparing the FOCs under laissez-faire with the ones describing the short-
run social optimum shows that the decentralization of the short-run optimum
requires a lump sum transfer system

TC ; TL
	
equalizing marginal utilities
of consumption across agents and periods. However, because of myopia, such
transfers do not su¢ ce to decentralize the optimum. Actually, the decentraliza-
tion of the optimal leisures for agents C and L requires group-specic Pigouvian
taxes on wages taking the impact of work on longevity into account:
C = hC0t+1
(dCt+1)
C (1  C) + pCCt+1'^+ pCLt+1~'
C
 
dCt+1
C 1
w
> 0 (12)
L = hL0t+1
(dLt+1)
L(1  L) + pLLt+1'^+ pLCt+1~'
L(dLt+1)
L 1w
> 0 (13)
Those Pigouvian taxes C and L are positive. Agents, whatever their type
is, tend, by ignoring the negative impact of work on longevity, to work too much,
so that a positive tax on wages is required to decentralize the social optimum.
Naturally, those taxes depend on the impact of leisure on longevity.22 Note that
C and L depend also positively on the expected welfare gains from coexistence
with ones child: the larger these are, the larger is the welfare loss due to myopia,
inviting a stronger correction.
Whereas those Pigouvian taxes, coupled with lump sum transfers, are neces-
sary to decentralize the social optimum, these are not su¢ cient. Actually, com-
paring the FOCs for optimal socialization e¤orts with the ones describing agents
decentralized choices reveals that the former are based on actual longevity levels,
whereas the latter are based on myopic anticipations. If, for instance, agents
of type C overestimate their longevity (i.e. E(hCt+1) = h
C
t > h
C
t+1), they in-
vest too much in the socialization of their child, so that the decentralization of
the short-run optimum requires some instruments making them choose lower
socialization e¤orts.
However, socialization e¤orts - which are here of purely physical nature (i.e.
nonmonetary and non-temporal) - can hardly be taxed or subsidized, as these
are personal, non-monitored, variables. Hence, it follows that transfers TC and
TL and Pigouvian taxes Cand L on wages do not su¢ ce, under myopia, to
decentralize the short-run optimum. Those results are summarized below.23
Proposition 5 The decentralization of the short-run social optimum requires:
- lump sum transfers TC and TL equalizing the marginal utilities of con-
sumption for all agents at all periods,
20The observability of types is in conformity with the model: the fact that one derives
welfare from coexisting with children of ones type requires the observability of types.
21As described in Section 2, the trait i 2 fC;Lg is taken once-and-for-all during the social-
ization process, so that there can be no adaptationto public policy.
22 If hC0t+1and h
L0
t+1 equal 0, the myopia is benign, so that 
C and L equal zero.
23See the Appendix for the proof.
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- group-specic Pigouvian taxes C and L on wages, equal to:
C = hC0t+1
(dCt+1)
C (1  C) + pCCt+1'^+ pCLt+1~'
C(dCt+1)
C 1w
> 0
L = hL0t+1
(dLt+1)
L(1  L) + pLLt+1'^+ pLCt+1~'
L(dLt+1)
L 1w
> 0
However, due to the physical nature of eCt and e
L
t , the optimal socialization
e¤ort levels cannot be decentralized.
Thus, the fact that the government cannot interfere with the socialization
decision, which relies on mistaken expectations on future longevity, prevents
the decentralization of the short-run optimum. Note that, at the steady-state,
myopic anticipations yield a perfect anticipation of longevity (as E(hit+1) =
hit = h
i
t+1), so that this problem disappears. However, as we shall now see, the
decentralization of the long-run social optimum requires also to deal with the -
so far neglected - e¤ects of agentsdecisions on future cohortscompositions.
3.2 The long-run rst-best problem
The long-run rst-best solution The above analysis, which studied the
decentralization of the social optimum, was carried out under a xed proportion
of the two types of agents. However, that postulate is a simplication, as the
partition of the population is generally not constant over time, and is likely to
be inuenced by agentsdecisions.
Actually, it is only in the special case of a homogeneous population - i.e.
qt is 0 or 1 -, that the tastes composition of the population remains the same
over time, so that there is no di¤erence between the short-run and the long-
run social optimum. Nevertheless, in the general case where some heterogeneity
exists initially, the steady-state level of q depends on the longevity of each group,
and, thus, on their leisure. Hence, there may be a large di¤erence between what
is optimal under a given partition of the population and what is optimal under
an endogenous composition.
In order to characterize the long-run social optimum, we shall here consider
that the social planner cannot choose the partition of the population q directly,
but, rather, can only choose the individual variables inuencing q under the
prevailing socialization process. That modelling strategy is based on a simple
analogy with the modelling of individual longevity: the socialization process is
like a survival process for types of agents, so that it makes sense to assume, as
with standard survival processes, that the socialization process is imposed as a
constraint to the social planner, who can only choose the inputs entering that
process, but cannot alter the process itself.
The rst-best long-run problem can thus be stated as the search for the
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octuplet

cC ; cL; dC ; dL; eC ; eL; lC ; lL
	
maximizing the Lagrangian:24
$ = (q)

(cC)
C
(lC)1 
C   (e
C)2
2
+ hC
h
(dC)
C
+ pCC '^+ pCL~'
i
+(1  q)

(cL)
L
(lL)1 
L   (e
L)2
2
+ hL
h
(dL)
L
+ pLL'^+ pLC ~'
i
+

w
 
q(1  lC) + (1  q)(1  lL)  qcC   (1  q)cL   qhCdC   (1  q)hLdL
where q takes its steady-state value h
C
hC+hL
.
The FOCs for optimal consumptions are:
C(cC)
C 1  lC1 C =  = L(cL)L 1(lL)1 L
C(dC)
C 1 =  = L(dL)
L 1
These are conditions of equalization of marginal utilities of consumption across
periods and agents. Once again, second-period consumption should not exceed
third-period consumption. As in the short-run social optimum, agents of type
C have a larger third-period consumption than agents of type L.
The FOCs for optimal socialization e¤orts are:
eC =
hC(1  q) ('^  ~')

eL =
hL(q) ('^  ~')

where hC , hL and q are at their optimal levels. Note that, given that q = h
C
hC+hL
at the steady-state, optimal socialization e¤orts are equal for all agents.
The FOCs for the optimal leisure time for agents of types C and L are:
@$
@lC
= q0hCh
C0 uC   uL+ q(cC)C (1  C)(lC) C
+qh0C
h
(dC)
C
(1  C) + pCC '^+ pCL~'
i
  qw
+q0hCh
C0 (1  lC)w   (1  lL)w   cC + cL   hCdC + hLdL
= 0
@$
@lL
= q0hLh
L0 uC   uL+ (1  q)  cLL (1  L)(lL) L
+(1  q)hL0
h
(dL)
L
(1  L) + pLL'^+ pLC ~'
i
  (1  q)w
+q0hLh
L0 (1  lC)w   (1  lL)w   cC + cL   hCdC + hLdL
= 0
24For simplicity, time indices are omitted here.
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Unlike the FOCs characterizing the short-run social optimum, those FOCs
capture the impact of agentslifestyles (i.e. leisure times) on the long-run com-
position of the population, through the terms multiplied by q0hih
i0 for i 2 fC;Lg.
The intuition behind those intergenerational composition e¤ects goes as follows.
When an agent chooses his leisure time, this determines his own longevity, which,
under myopic anticipations on longevity, will also a¤ect the socialization e¤orts
of agents of the same type (taking him as a model) at the next generation
(through its impact on agentstemporal horizons). Thus there exists an innite
chain linking all generationslifestyles. That chain is not taken into account by
the social planner in the short-run rst-best problem, but well in the long-run
rst-best problem. This explains the di¤erence between the FOCs of the two
problems.
Note that it is only in the special case where the partition of the population
is xed - q0hC = q
0
hL = 0 - that those FOCs would collapse to the ones describing
the short-run optimum. In comparison with the FOCs characterizing the short-
run optimum, each of those FOC includes two additional terms.
The rst term, q0hCh
C0 uC   uL, captures the impact, in welfare terms, of
the change in the partition of the population resulting from a variation in the
agents leisure time. If, for instance, the lifetime welfare of an agent of type C
- denoted by uC - exceeds the one of an agent of type L, the rst term of the
FOC for lC is positive, implying, ceteris paribus, a higher lC , in such a way as
to raise the proportion of agents of type C at the steady-state. On the contrary,
under uC > uL, the rst term of the FOC for lL is negative, implying a lower
leisure lL for agents of type L, in such a way as to reduce their proportion in the
long-run. Hence, the rst term has opposite signs for the two types of agents.
The other additional term (the last term of the FOC) consists of the impact
of a marginal change in the partition of the population on the resources of the
economy. If, for instance, agents of type C are net contributors, the factor in
brackets is positive, inviting, ceteris paribus, a higher proportion of agents of
that type, and, thus, a higher leisure level for them. Here again, those additional
terms are of opposite signs in the two FOCs, as the derivatives q0hC and q
0
hL
multiplying the factors in brackets are of opposite signs in the two FOCs.
Comparing the FOCs for optimal leisure with the ones under laissez-faire
suggests that the leisure of one type of agent at the social optimum may be
superior or inferior to its level under laissez-faire, depending on whether the
sum of those two additional terms with the myopia term of the FOC is positive
or negative. The following proposition summarizes the above ndings.25
Proposition 6 The long-run social optimum is such that:
- ciFB  diFB 8i 2 fC;Lg ; dCFB > dLFB ; cCFB
lCFB
> c
LFB
lLFB
;
- eCFB = eLFB
- liLF S liFB i¤ 
i T 0 8i 2 fC;Lg,
where 
i  qih0i
h
(diFB)
i
(1  i) + piiFB'^+ pijFB ~'
i
+q0hih
i0 uCFB   uLFB
25The term qi denotes the long-run size of the group of agents of type i 2 fC;Lg. See the
Appendix for the proof.
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+q0hih
i0 (1  lCFB)w   (1  lLFB)w   cCFB + cLFB   hCFBdCFB + hLFBdLFB.
Decentralization of the long-run social optimum Comparing the
FOCs for optimal long-run consumptions with the ones at the laissez-faire shows
that the decentralization of the long-run social optimum requires, as in the
short-run case, lump sum transfers

TC ; TL
	
equalizing marginal utilities of
consumption across agents and periods.
Regarding the decentralization of the optimal socialization e¤orts levels, the
comparison of the FOCs of the laissez-faire with the ones characterizing the
social optimum shows that, as long as leisure times - and, through hC and hL,
the composition of the population q - take their optimal values, the optimal
e¤ort levels will also prevail.26
Contrasting the FOCs relative to the choice of leisure times reveals that
the Pigouvian taxes designed for the decentralization of the short-run social
optimum are no longer appropriate here, because of the endogeneity of the
partition of the population. Agents choose their leisure time without considering
its impact on the composition of future cohorts. Hence, besides the correction for
myopia, the decentralization of the long-run optimum requires also a correction
for those intergenerational externalities due to the socialization process.27
Proposition 7 The long-run social optimum can be decentralized by means of:
- lump sum transfers TC and TL yielding an equalization of marginal utilities
of consumption across agents and periods;
- Pigouvian taxes C and L on wages equal to:
C =
[1]
hC0
(dC)
C
(1  C) + pCC '^+ pCL~'
w
+
[2]
q0hC
q
hC0
uC   uL
w
+
[3]
q0hC
q
hC0
w(1  lC)  w(1  lL)  cC + cL   hCdC + hLdL
w
L =
[10]
hL0
(dL)
L
(1  L) + pLL'^+ pLC ~'
w
+
[20]
q0hL
1  q h
L0u
C   uL
w
+
[30]
q0hL
1  q h
L0w(1  lC)  w(1  lL)  cC + cL   hCdC + hLdL
w
The comparison of those Pigouvian taxes C and L allowing the decen-
tralization of the long-run optimum with the ones in the short-run rst-best
problem suggests that the long-run optimal tax is equal to short-run optimal
tax [i.e. term [1]] - internalizing the impact of myopia on ones own lifetime
26Note that, given the constancy of longevity at the steady-state, myopic anticipations are
benign at steady-state for the choice of socialization e¤orts, so that lump sum transfers do
not need to be complemented by - hardly implementable - instruments on e¤orts.
27See the Appendix for the proof.
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welfare - plus the correction for the unintended composition e¤ectsof leisure
decisions on the composition of future populations [i.e. terms [2] and [3]].
Note rst that, if each agents longevity had no impact on the composition
of the population - i.e. q0hC = q
0
hL = 0 - Pigouvian taxes 
C and L would be
equal to their short-run levels. However, given that, for an initial q0 2 ]0; 1[, the
steady-state q equals h
C
hC+hL
, the longevity of each group inuences the long-
run composition of the population. Hence, the social planner, when xing the
Pigouvian taxes, must take that intergenerational externality into account.28
Let us now interpret the two new components of the optimal tax rates.29
The term [2] accounts for the social welfare gains from changing, ceteris
paribus, the composition of the population q. That term is a product of three
factors: the rst is the marginal e¤ect, on q, of a rise of agents Cs longevity;
the second is the marginal e¤ect, on agents Cs longevity, of a higher leisure lC ;
the third factor, uC   uL, is the di¤erence between lifetime welfares enjoyed by
agents of types C and L.
The term [3] accounts for the marginal e¤ect, on the available resources, of
a rise of the proportion of agents of type C as a result of a higher lC . The sign
of that term is also ambiguous: it is not clear that a rise of q resulting from a
higher lC increases or reduces the amount of available resources in the economy.
Note that, contrary to the decentralization of the short-run optimum, it is
not easy to see which signs Pigouvian taxes C and L have: this depends on the
signs and sizes of their three components. If, for instance, the lifestyle of agents
of type C brings a higher lifetime welfare than the one of agents of type L [i.e.
[2] > 0], and if increasing the proportion of agents of type C tends also to raise
the resources in the economy [i.e. [3] > 0], the internalization of the myopia and
of unintended composition e¤ects go in the same directions, and require agents
of type C to work less. Hence, a positive tax on the labour income of agents
of type C is required to restore the social optimum by making them work less
than under the laissez-faire. If, on the contrary, agents of type C have a lower
lifetime welfare than agents of type L, and if [1] + [3] < j[2]j, it follows, despite
the myopia of agents of type C, that the decentralization of the long-run social
optimum requires to subsidize their labour, as these tend to work too little from
a social perspective.
Finally, it should be stressed that Pigouvian taxes and lump sum transfers
allow the decentralization of the long-run optimum, as socialization e¤orts are,
under these, optimally chosen, unlike what prevailed in the short-run. Actu-
ally, agents, when choosing how much to socialize their child, still rely here on
expected longevities rather than actual longevities, but given the constancy of
longevity over time, this does not prevent the optimal level of e¤ort to be cho-
sen. Thus the decentralization of the long-run social optimum can, despite the
physical nature of e¤orts, be carried out.
28Note also that, if leisure time had no impact on longevity, i.e. hC0 = hL0 = 0, the optimal
tax rates would be zero, as agentsmyopia and ignorance of the impact of their decisions on
the composition of the future cohorts would then be benign.
29For that purpose, we shall concentrate on terms [2] and [3] in C .
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Comparison of short-run and long-run Pigouvian taxes A major
corollary of the above analysis is that the optimal short-run and long-run Pigou-
vian taxes di¤er. The reason for this is that, in the short-run problem, the
maximization of the social welfare of the cohort can be performed by the social
planner without being concerned with the taste composition of future cohorts:
correcting current myopia is the only thing that matters from a short-run per-
spective. However, from a long-run perspective, agentsdecisions are imperfect
not only from the point of view of individual lifetime welfare maximization,
but, also, from the perspective of the composition of future cohorts tastes.
This double imperfection of leisure decisions invites a double correction.
Regarding the extent to which the short-run Pigouvian taxes di¤er from
the long-run ones, let us rst notice that the terms [2] and [20] must be of
opposite signs: if agents Cs lifestyle brings a higher lifetime welfare than the
one of agents of type L, then agents Ls lifestyle must also bring a lower lifetime
welfare than the one of agents of type C. Terms [3] and [30] are also of opposite
signs: if agents of type C are net contributors, agents of type L must be net
beneciaries. From this, one can characterize the di¤erence between short-run
and long-run Pigouvian taxes as follows.30
Proposition 8 Let  iSR and  iLR denote the Pigouvian taxes on agent is wage
required for the decentralization of the short-run and long-run social optima, for
i 2 fC;Lg. We have: CLR   CSR T 0() LLR   LSR S 0:
This proposition states that the correction for composition e¤ects raises the
tax on the labour of one type of agents, and reduces the tax on the labour of the
other type. Hence, the optimal long-run tax on labour is, for one group, higher
than its optimal short-run level, whereas the opposite holds for the other group.
In other words, shifting from the maximization of short-run social welfare to
the maximization of long-run social welfare tends, for one type of agents, to
reinforce the correction required by the myopia - and make those agents live
more than what maximizes their lifetime welfare -, whereas that shift weakens
the correction required by the myopia for the other type of agents, and makes
those other agents live less than what maximizes their lifetime welfare.
Although that result seems counter-intuitive, this comes from the fact that,
from a utilitarian point of view, the tendency of agents to work too much with
respect to what is the best for them is not the unique determinant of public
intervention. A utilitarian government must also, in its intervention, take the
composition e¤ects of agentsdecisions into account. When agents decide how
much to work - and unconsciously choose their longevity -, they also a¤ect the
time horizon of the next cohort taking them as models(either as a parent or as
a role model). The members of the next cohort will then choose, on the basis
of their models, their socialization e¤orts, determining the composition of the
next generation, who will proceed similarly, and so forth. Hence, internalizing
those intergenerational externalities involves making agents work more or less -
and live less or more - than what maximizes their own lifetime welfares.
30See the Appendix for the proof.
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4 Conclusions
This paper aimed at studying the optimal tax policy in an economy where un-
equal longevities are the unintended outcome of di¤erences in lifestyles, and
where lifestyles are transmitted across generations. For that purpose, we devel-
oped a three-period OLG model, where the length of the third period depends
on second period leisure, and where the population, who ignores the impact of
work on longevity, is partitioned in two groups with di¤erent tastes for leisure,
and follows a socialization process à la Bisin and Verdier (2001).
We showed that the long-run social optimum can be decentralized by means
of (1) inter-group lump sum transfers; (2) group-specic Pigouvian taxes on
wages, which internalize not only the unintended e¤ects of leisure on individual
lifetime welfare, but, also, its impact on the composition of future cohorts. This
paper shows also that the shift from the maximization of short-run social wel-
fare to the maximization of long-run social welfare changes the optimal policy:
taking intergenerational composition e¤ects into account raises the optimal tax
on labour for one type of agents, but reduces it for the other type.
Thus, the endogeneity of the populations preferences is far from neutral
for the optimal public intervention. Therefore, while it is tempting to discuss
the optimal public policy in a static framework - for a given partition of the
population in terms of tastes -, the policy recommendations from such a static
study may, by neglecting intergenerational externalities, di¤er signicantly from
what would best serve the long-run interests of the economy.
Note that our conclusions should be treated with extreme caution. A rst,
obvious reason for this is that these rely on standard utilitarianism, and thus
leave little room for - possibly strong - intuitions about compensation. Moreover,
the government, by its scal policy, a¤ects here what future people will be,
which is, from a liberal point of view, questionable, as such an intervention may
match the behaviour of a uniforming totalitarian State.31 However, it should
be stressed that the State interferences studied here, which shape the tastes
of (future) non existing people, di¤er from inuences on the tastes of existing
people, so that one cannot accuse the social planner of totalitarianism.32
At the end of the day, the major question raised by this paper concerns
the arbitrages to be made between the interests of existing people versus the
ones of future, non-existing people. Correcting a myopia may well improve the
welfare of current people, but, by the composition e¤ects it generates, may also
reduce long-run welfare, so that an arbitrage is to be made between the welfare
of current cohorts and the welfare of future cohorts. This kind of dilemma,
raised, for instance, by Malthus (1798) in the context of poverty reduction, goes
far beyond the scope of this paper.33 But the complexity of solving intergen-
31The tensions between utilitarianism and liberalism in the context of a heterogeneous soci-
ety are best summarized in Mills (1859) work on the conditions required for State intervention.
32On the latter, see Hahn (1982).
33Malthuss argument against the Poor Laws was that those laws, although reducing poverty
in the short-run, would, by favouring population growth, lead to a rise in the proportion of
poor people in the long-run.
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erational trade-o¤s should not make us do as if such arbitrages did not exist.
Tensions between short-run and long-run social welfare maximization exist, and
governments have no other reasonable choices than to take these into account.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Laissez-faire
6.1.1 Temporary equilibrium
The expression c
i
t
dit+1
= lit is obtained from rearranging the rst two FOCs. From
this, it follows that, under 0  lit  1, it must be the case that cit  dit+1 8i 2
fC;Lg.
Actually, if the budget constraint is binding, we have cit+h
i
td
i
t+1 = w(1  lit),
so that, given the above expression, we can deduce that: cit =
litw(1 lit)
lit+h
i
t
.
From the rst and third FOCs, we have: lit =
1 i
i
cit
w : Substituting for c
i
t in
this yields: lit = 1   i(1 + hit). From that expression, it is easy to see that, if
hLt = h
C
t =
ht, we have also, given 
L < C , lCt < l
L
t . Moreover, given that
dit+1 =
cit
lit
=
w(1 lit)
lit+h
i
t
, it follows that lCt < l
L
t and h
L
t = h
C
t =
ht imply also
dCt+1 > d
L
t+1. Given that
cit
dit+1
= lit, this implies also
cCt
lCt+1
>
cLt
lLt+1
.
Under the general case where hLt 6= hCt , we know that agents of type C choose
a lower leisure than agents of type L if and only if: 1 C(1+hCt ) < 1 L(1+hLt ).
This is true if and only if: 
C
L
>
1+hLt
1+hCt
.
Given that hLt ; h
C
t 2 [0; 1] and hLt > hCt , that condition is satised for all
longevities if and only if 
C
L
> 2. Note that if lCt < l
L
t , we have d
C
t+1 > d
L
t+1,
as w(1 l
C
t )
lCt +h
C
t
>
w(1 lLt )
lLt +h
L
t
under hLt > h
C
t . Given that
cit
dit+1
= lit, this implies also
cCt
lCt+1
>
cLt
lLt+1
.
The inequality condition on e¤orts levels follows from comparing the two
e¤orts levels in the above FOC: h
C
t (1 qt)('^ ~')
 T
hLt (qt)('^ ~')
 () h
C
t
hLt
T qt1 qt .
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6.1.2 Steady-state equilibrium
Existence of steady-states The dynamics of the economy is given by:
qt+1 = F (qt; h
C
t ; h
L
t ) = qt +
'^  ~'

 
hCt (1  qt)2qt   hLt (qt)2(1  qt)

hCt+1 = G(h
C
t ) =
1  C(1 + hCt )
2  C(1 + hCt )
hLt+1 = H(h
L
t ) =
1  L(1 + hLt )
2  L(1 + hLt )
Imposing hCt+1 = h
C
t and h
L
t+1 = h
L
t yields:
hC =
1  2
q
1  C(1  C)
C
;hL =
1  2
q
1  L(1  L)
L
Those two levels are independent from each others, and independent from q.
Substituting for these in the dynamic law for q and dening (qt)  qt+1
yields:
(qt) = qt+
'^  ~'

0@1  2
q
1  C(1  C)
C
(1  qt)2qt  
1  2
q
1  L(1  L)
L
(qt)
2(1  qt)
1A
The existence of a steady-state equilibrium amounts to nd a xed point for
(qt), that is, a value of qt such that (qt) = qt. It is obvious that qt = 0 and
qt = 1 are such xed points, as (0) = 0 and (1) = 1. Hence, the homogenous
society is a steady-state equilibrium.
The existence of an intermediate steady-state equilibrium - i.e. an equilib-
rium involving some heterogeneity - amounts to nd a value of qt 2 ]0; 1[ such
that (qt) = qt.
Note that (qt) satises the following conditions:
(i) (0) = 0
(ii) (1) = 1
(iii) 0  (qt)  1
(iv) limq!0 0(qt) = 1 + '^ ~'
1  2
p
1 C(1 C)
C
> 1
(v) limq!1 0(qt) = 1 + '^ ~'
1  2
p
1 L(1 L)
L
> 1
Thus, given that (qt) crosses the 45 line at qt = 0 and qt = 1, and has a
slope that exceeds 1 when qt tends towards 0 and when qt tends towards 1, it
must be the case, given the continuity of (qt), that (qt) intersects the 45 line
for qt 2 ]0; 1[ :
The uniqueness of that intermediate steady-state can be shown by reductio
ad absurdum. Suppose that such another intermediate equilibrium ~q 2 ]0; 1[
exists, and di¤ers from h
C
hL+hC
: This amounts to assuming that equals ~q =
hC
hL+hC
+ ", with " 6= 0, " 6= hL
hL+hC
and " 6=  hC
hL+hC
.
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We have, by denition of the steady-state,
~q = ~q +
'^  ~'

 
hC(1  ~q)2~q   hL(~q)2(1  ~q)
Given that '^ ~' > 0, this simplies to: h
C(1  ~q)2~q  hL(~q)2(1  ~q) = 0. As
~q 2 ]0; 1[, we can divide by ~q and (1  ~q), and we obtain: ~q = hC
hL+hC
, implying
" = 0, contrary to what was assumed. Thus the intermediate steady-state is
unique.
Stability of the intermediate steady-state In order to study the (local)
stability of the intermediate steady-state equilibrium, let us rst notice that
the present system is non-linear, so that the conventional analysis of the Ja-
cobian matrix (composed of the rst-order derivatives of dynamic equations
with respect to state variables) can only inform us on the stability of equilib-
ria provided these are hyperbolic. Actually, if a xed-point is hyperbolic, the
Hartman-Grobman Theorem states that the stability of the linearized system
(or its non-stability) implies the local stability of the non-linear system (or its
non-stability) (see Medio and Lines, 2001). However, if the xed-point is not
hyperbolic, then the analysis of the linearized system does not allow us to draw
any conclusion on the local stability of the non-linear system.
As stated in Medio and Lines (2001), xed-points are, in discrete-time sys-
tems, hyperbolic if none of the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix, evaluated at
the equilibrium, is equal to 1 in modulo.
The Jacobian matrix is dened as follows.
J 
0B@
@F
@qt
@F
@hCt
@F
@hLt
@G
@qt
@G
@hCt
@G
@hLt
@H
@qt
@H
@hCt
@H
@hLt
1CA
We have, at the intermediate steady-state:
@F
@qt
= 1  '^ ~' h
ChL
hC+hL
< 1 and positive (as '^ ~' h
C  1).
@F
@hCt
= '^ ~'

hL
hC+hL
2
hC
hC+hL
< 1 and positive (as '^ ~' h
C  1).
@F
@hLt
=   '^ ~'

hC
hC+hL
2
hL
hC+hL
>  1 and negative.
@G
@qt
= 0
@G
@hCt
=  
C
[2 C(1+hCt )]
2 >  1 and negative.
@G
@hLt
= 0
@H
@qt
= 0
@H
@hCt
= 0
@H
@hLt
=  
L
[2 L(1+hLt )]
2 >  1 and negative.
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Note rst that the trace of the Jacobian matrix is:
1  '^  ~'

hChL
hC + hL
+
 Ch
2  C(1 + hCt )
i2 +  Lh
2  L(1 + hLt )
i2
which lies, under our assumptions on '^ ~' , 
C and L, between -1 and 1.
The determinant of the Jacobian matrix is:
1  '^  ~'

hChL
hC + hL
  Ch
2  C(1 + hCt )
i2  Lh
2  L(1 + hLt )
i2
which lies between 0 and 1.
We would like the linearized system to be stable. As this is well-known,
a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the stability of the linearized system
is that all eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix estimated at the equilibrium are
magnitudes less than 1. That condition implies also that the equilibrium is
hyperbolic, leading to the (local) stability of the equilibrium.
Following Brooks (2004)s study of stability in rst-order three-dimensional
dynamic systems, we know that all eigenvalues of a 3x3 Jacobian matrix are
lower than 1 in modulo provided the following three conditions are satised:
(i) jdet(J)j < 1
(ii) 1 > [
P
Mi(J)]  [tr(J)] [det(J)] + [det(J)]2
(iii)   [PMi(J) + 1] < tr(J) + det(J) < [PMi(J) + 1]
where det(J), tr(J) and
P
Mi(J) denote respectively the determinant, the
trace and the sum of the principal minors of the Jacobian matrix.
Condition (i) is satised (see above).
Regarding condition (ii), note rst that
P
Mi(J) is here equal to:h
1  '^ ~' h
ChL
hC+hL
i 
1  C+L
[2 C(1+hC)]2

+  
C
[2 C(1+hCt )]
2 +
 L
[2 L(1+hL)]2
+
h
2  '^ ~' h
ChL
hC+hL
i
 C
[2 C(1+hC)]2
 L
[2 L(1+hL)]2
Hence, condition (ii) requires: 1 > [
P
Mi(J)]  [tr(J)] [det(J)] + [det(J)]2
1 >
h
1  '^ ~' h
ChL
hC+hL
i 
1  C+L
[2 C(1+hC)]2

+  
C
[2 C(1+hCt )]
2 +
 L
[2 L(1+hL)]2
+
h
2  '^ ~' h
ChL
hC+hL
i
 C
[2 C(1+hC)]2
 L
[2 L(1+hL)]2
 

1  '^ ~' h
ChL
hC+hL
  C
[2 C(1+hC)]2
  L
[2 L(1+hL)]2
 h
1  '^ ~' h
ChL
hC+hL
i
C
[2 C(1+hC)]2
L
[2 L(1+hL)]2

+
h
1  '^ ~' h
ChL
hC+hL
i
C
[2 C(1+hC)]2
L
[2 L(1+hL)]2
2
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That condition holds for low values of C and L, in conformity with our
assumptions.
Condition (iii) requires:   [PMi(J) + 1] < tr(J) + det(J) < [PMi(J) + 1]
That condition simplies to
 
h
1  '^ ~' h
ChL
hC+hL
i 
1  C+L
[2 C(1+hC)]2

 
h
2  '^ ~' h
ChL
hC+hL
i
C
[2 C(1+hC)]2
L
[2 L(1+hL)]2
 
1
<
h
1  '^ ~' h
ChL
hC+hL
i 
1 + 
C
[2 C(1+hC)]2
L
[2 L(1+hL)]2

<
h
1  '^ ~' h
ChL
hC+hL
i 
1  C+L
[2 C(1+hC)]2

+
h
2  '^ ~' h
ChL
hC+hL
i
C
[2 C(1+hC)]2
L
[2 L(1+hL)]2
+
1
It is straightfoward to see that, under our assumptions on '^ ~' , 
C and L,
those two inequalities are satised, so that condition (iii) holds.
Under conditions (i)-(iii), all eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix are less than
1 in modulo, so that the equilibrium is stable. Moreover, those conditions guar-
antee also that no eigenvalue equals 1 in modulo, and, thus, the hyperbolicity
of the equilibrium. Hence, from the Hartman-Grobman Theorem, it can be
concluded that, under conditions (i)-(iii), the steady-state is locally stable.
6.2 Social optimum
6.2.1 Short-run rst-best problem
The rst-best short-run solution From the rst two FOCs, we have c
i
t
dit+1
=
lit 8i 2 fC;Lg. Note also that C(dCt+1)
C 1 =  = L(dLt+1)
L 1. Given that
C > L, we have (dCt+1)
C 1 < (dLt+1)
L 1. Thus, given that C ; L < 1 and
C > L, this implies dCt+1 > d
L
t+1. Combining this with the above expression
yields: c
C
t
lCt
>
cLt
lLt
.
The FOC for optimal leisure can be written as
1  i
i
cit
lit
+ hi0
di
i
t+1(1  i) + piit+1'^+ pijt+1~'
id
i(i 1)
t+1
= w
Comparing this with the FOC under laissez-faire, 1 
i
i
cit
lit
= w, implies that
we must have liLFt < l
iFB
t 8i 2 fC;Lg.
The optimal e¤orts levels are given by: eCFBt =
hCt+1(1 qt)'
 and e
LFB
t =
hLt+1(qt)'
 . Comparing these with the ones under laissez-faire: e
CLF
t =
hCt (1 qt)'

and eLLFt =
hLt (qt)'
 implies that e
iFB
t exceeds e
iLF
t if and only if the socially
optimal longevity hit+1 exceeds the prevailing longevity h
i
t, which may or may
not be the case.34
34Note that, although agents tend to overwork, the socialization decision is based on the
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Decentralization of short-run optimum The decentralized FOCs are:
C(cCt )
C 1(lCt )
1 C = C L(cLt )
L 1(lLt )
1 L = L
C(dCt+1)
C 1 = C L(dLt+1)
L 1 = L
(1  C)(cCt )
C
(lCt )
 C = Cw (1  L)(cLt )
L
(lLt )
 L = Lw
eCt =
hCt+1(1 qt)('^ ~')
 e
L
t =
hLt+1(qt)('^ ~')

Actually, if transfers TC and TL are such that, after redistribution:
C(cCt )
C 1(lCt )
1 C = L(cLt )
L 1(lLt )
1 L = 
C(dCt+1)
C 1 =  = L(dLt+1)
L 1
as required in the social optimum, substituting for  in the FOCs for optimal
leisure yields:
(1 C)cCt
C lCt
= w
(1 L)cLt
LlLt
= w
Comparing these with the FOCs for socially optimal leisures:
(1  C)cCt
C lCt
+ hC0t+1
(dCt+1)
C (1  C) + pCCt+1'^+ pCLt+1~'
C(dCt+1)
C 1 = w
(1  L)cLt
LlLt
+ hL0t+1
(dLt+1)
L(1  L) + pLLt+1'^+ pLCt+1~'
L(dL1 )
L 1 = w
suggests that taxes
C = hC0t+1
(dCt+1)
C (1  C) + pCCt+1'^+ pCLt+1~'
C
 
dCt+1
C 1
w
L = hL0t+1
(dLt+1)
L(1  L) + pLLt+1'^+ pLCt+1~'
L(dLt+1)
L 1w
on wages allow the satisfaction of above FOCs.
Note that, provided the socialization e¤orts took their optimal values, those
taxes, if combined with the lump sum transfers dened above, would allow the
decentralization of the social optimum. However, e¤orts are not optimally cho-
sen, because agents, when choosing how much to socialize their child, rely on
expected longevities rather than actual longevities. Given the purely physi-
cal nature of socialization e¤orts, the decentralization of the short-run social
optimum under myopia cannot be carried out.
expected - rather than actual - longevity, so that nothing guarantees an underinvestment in
socialization.
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6.2.2 Long-run rst-best problem
The rst-best long-run solution From the rst two FOCs, we have c
i
di =
li 8i 2 fC;Lg. Note also that C(dC)C 1 =  = L(dL)L 1. Given that
C > L, we have (dC)
C 1 < (dL)
L 1. Thus, given that C ; L < 1 and
C > L, this implies dC > dL. Combining this with the above expression
yields: c
C
lC
> c
L
lL
.
The equality of socialization e¤orts levels follows from the FOCs and the
fact that q = h
C
hC+hL
at the steady-state equilibrium.
Regarding leisure times, comparing the FOCs for optimal leisure times with
the ones under laissez-faire shows that the laissez-faire level of lC is inferior to
its socially optimum level if and only if:
q0hCh
C0 uC   uL+ qh0C h(dC)C (1  C) + pCC '^+ pCL~'i
+q0hCh
C0 (1  lC)w   (1  lL)w   cC + cL   hCdC + hLdL
> 0
Similarly, the laissez-faire level of lL is inferior its socially optimum level if
and only if:
q0hLh
L0 uC   uL++(1  q)hL0 h(dL)L(1  L) + pLL'^+ pLC ~'i
+q0hLh
L0 (1  lC)w   (1  lL)w   cC + cL   hCdC + hLdL
> 0
These inequalities are the ones in Proposition 6.
Decentralization of the long-run social optimum The FOCs are:
C(cC)
C 1(lC)1 
C
= C L(cL)
L 1(lL)1 
L
= L
C(dC)
C 1 = C L(dL)
L 1 = L
(1  C)(cC)C (lC) C = Cw (1  L)(cL)L(lL) L = Lw
eC = h
C(1 q)('^ ~')
 e
L = h
L(q)('^ ~')

Actually, transfers TC and TL are such that, after redistribution:
C(cC)
C 1(lC)1 
C
= L(cL)
L 1(lL)1 
L
= 
C(dC)
C 1 =  = L(dL)
L 1
Substituting for  in the FOCs for optimal leisure yields:
(1 C)cC
C lC
= w (1 
L)cL
LlL
= w
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Comparing these with the FOCs for socially optimal leisures
@$
@lC
= q0hCh
C0 uC   uL+ q(cC)C (1  C)(lC) C
+qh0C
h
(dC)
C
(1  C) + pCC '^+ pCL~'
i
  qw
+q0hCh
C0 (1  lC)w   (1  lL)w   cC + cL   hCdC + hLdL
= 0
@$
@lL
= q0hLh
L0 uC   uL+ (1  q)  cLL (1  L)(lL) L
+(1  q)hL0
h
(dL)
L
(1  L) + pLL'^+ pLC ~'
i
  (1  q)w
+q0hLh
L0 (1  lC)w   (1  lL)w   cC + cL   hCdC + hLdL
= 0
suggests that taxes
C =
q0hC
q
hC0
uC   uL
w
+ hC0
(dC)
C
(1  C) + pCC '^+ pCL~'
w
+
q0hC
q
hC0
w(1  lC)  w(1  lL)  cC + cL   hCdC + hLdL
w
L =
q0hL
1  q h
L0u
C   uL
w
+ hL0
(dL)
L
(1  L) + pLL'^+ pLC ~'
w
+
q0hL
1  q h
L0w(1  lC)  w(1  lL)  cC + cL   hCdC + hLdL
w
on wages allow the satisfaction of above FOCs.
Those taxes, if combined with the lump sum transfers dened above, allow
the decentralization of the social optimum, as e¤orts are, under that tax and
transfer system, optimally chosen, unlike in the short-run.
Comparison of short-run and long-run Pigouvian taxes To see why
[2] + [3] and [20] + [30] must be of opposite signs, it su¢ ces to notice that:
q0
hC
q =
hL
hC(hC+hL)
> 0
q0
hL
1 q =
 hC
hL(hC+hL)
< 0
Moreover, the factors u
C uL
w and
w(1 lC) w(1 lL) cC+cL hCdC+hLdL
w are
present in the formulae of C and L. Hence, it is easy to see that, whatever the
signs and sizes of u
C uL
w and
w(1 lC) w(1 lL) cC+cL hCdC+hLdL
w are, [2]+[3] and
[20] + [30] are necessary of opposite signs. Thus, if CLR  CSR  0, it must be
the case that the composition e¤ect component of the tax is positive for C, and
thus negative for L, so that LLR   LSR  0. Moreover, if LLR   LSR  0,
it must also be the case that CLR   CSR  0.
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